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SECTION 14(e) OF THE WILLIAMS ACT: FORMULATED
LOCK-UPS ARE NOT MANIPULATIVE ACTS IN
CONNECTION WITH A TENDER OFFER-MOBIL CORP.
v. MARATHON OIL CO. RUNS OUT OF GAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The cash tender offer 1 emerged on the corporate scene in the
early 1960's to expedite the takeover process' by circumventing the
excessive regulation in the field of conventional mergers. Initially,
the tender offer was viewed solely as an unethical tool used by "cor-
porate raiders."' However, with the passage of the Williams Act in
1968,' the modern tender offer evolved into a respectable means of
corporate acquisition.5 To avoid being acquired in an unwanted
takeover attempt, "target"' corporations began to develop an array of
defensive techniques to fend off unwanted solicitations.7 These tactics
0 1984 by William T. Lewis. The author wishes to thank Daniel Subotnik, Professor of
Law, Seton Hall University, for his inspiration and guidance.
1. The cash tender offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy
shares of a company, generally offering a premium price. Those accepting the offer are said to
tender their shares for purchase. The offeror obligates himself to purchase all or a specified
portion of the shares tendered, provided certain conditions are met. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811 [hereinafter
cited as 1968 HousE REPORT].
2. In connection with tender offers, a number of colloquialisms have been developed by
specialists in the field to describe the participants and processes involved:
a. Takeover process: the act of one corporation or group of individuals acquiring control
over another corporation.
b. Target corporation: the corporation whose stock is the subject of the tender offer.
c. Aggressor: the corporation or group of individuals making the unsolicited tender offer;
also known as a "raider."
d. White Knight: a third party corporation or group of individuals who is sympathetic
to the present management of the target and enters into an agreement or bidding contest in an
attempt to defeat a hostile bid.
3. See supra note 2.
4. The Williams Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 78 m-n (1964)).
5. See generally Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Take-
over Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1967) (testimony of Samuel L. Hayes III,
Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University) [hereinafter cited as
1967 Senate Hearings]; Nathan, Lock-ups and Leg-ups: The Searchfor Security in the Acqui-
sitions Marketplace, 13 ANN. INsT. ON SEc. REG. 1 (1981).
6. See supra note 2.
7. Among the defensive tactics used by incumbent management to thwart unsolicited
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were designed to avoid direct competition with the "aggressor"' cor-
poration for the support of the shareholders." By thwarting the ag-
gressor's ability to make the offer, target management can paternal-
istically protect shareholders from being "lulled" into tendering their
offers at their inception, or shortly thereafter, are the following:
a. Litigation: the target corporation may institute litigation focusing pri-
marily on inadequate disclosure by the aggressor, as required by the securities
law, or on antitrust grounds, asserting that the combination would substantially
reduce competition. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
b. Target Share Repurchases: this strategy is used to reduce the number
of shares available to the aggressor by buying-out disgruntled shareholders who
are more likely to sell; such repurchases are also helpful in raising the price for
the remaining shares by increasing demand. See, e.g., Nathan and Sobel, Corpo-
rate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicted Takeover Bids, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1545 (1980). The Williams Act § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(e) (1968),
requires disclosure of the purposes of issuer repurchase under certain
circumstances.
c. Increase Dividends: an increase in dividend payments boosts share-
holder satisfaction with existing management as well as increases the value of
the stock, forcing the aggressor to raise his price.
d. Create Antitrust Problems: the target may acquire certain other con-
cerns so as to create antitrust incompatibility. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 646 F.2d 271, (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
e. Amend Corporate Charter: incumbent management may seek to make
any takeover more time consuming, such as by staggering the election of the
board of directors or by increasing the minimum number of shares needed to
effect any post-acquisition merger. See Comment, Antitakeover Maneuvers: De-
velopments in Defense Tactics and Target Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw.
L.J. 617, 623-25 (1981).
f. Contract Clauses: the target can make a takeover financially prohibitive
in post-acquisition costs by conditioning major loans to become due and payable
should the target be acquired by a third party. Similarly, long term employment
contracts with existing management can be used. See id. at 623.
g. Enlist the Aid of a White Knight: the target may reach an agreement
with a "friendly" third party and arrange a defensive merger of the target with
the friendly third party. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977).
See generally Comment, Antitakeover Maneuvers: Developments in Defense Tactics and Tar-
get Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw. L.J. 617 (1981); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tac-
tics - Federal Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633, 634 n.5
(1982).
8. See supra note 2.
9. Rather than competing directly with the aggressor, target managements have concen-
trated their efforts at preventing the offer at its inception, thus eliminating the possibility of an
incorrect decision by the shareholders. In this manner, target management need not convince
shareholders that the existing board was doing a superior job. Also, by preventing a hostile
offer, target management can avoid a shareholder comparison of the present value of the tar-
get's anticipated future returns with the premium being offered by the aggressor. See Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819-21 (1981).
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shares to the aggressor. A relatively recent development in the defen-
sive arsenal of management is the use of the "formulated lock-up."
The lock-up is broadly defined as an arrangement, in connec-
tion with the proposed acquisition of a publicly held business, that
gives the proposed acquiror an advantage in acquiring the target
over other bidders."' Lock-ups may take the form of stock options for
authorized but unissued shares, options to purchase principal assets,
or other types of arrangements in which the "white knight"1" re-
ceives a preferred position in any competitive bidding for the target.
These lock-ups are frequently used as a first step toward a defensive
merger or a competing tender offer. Lock-ups are often extracted
from the target as a condition before the white knight will enter into
the picture. At other times, offers of lock-ups are used by targets to
entice a hesitant white knight into entering a competitive bidding
contest with the aggressor.12
The use of lock-ups by target corporations has been recognized
as a situation wrought with inherent conflict of interest by target
directors. Even though incumbent management generates some mini-
mal business purpose for the lock-up, shareholders have recognized
that often director action is influenced more by a desire to preserve
the directors' own positions of power and influence than by any gen-
uine intent to act in the shareholders' best interest. As such, there is
a genuine need for shareholders to have some recourse against direc-
tors for actions taken by the board contrary to the shareholders' best
interest. The implementation of lock-ups by target corporations has
produced litigation involving both the federal securities law and state
corporation law.
This comment discusses the use of lock-ups in tender offers, be-
ginning with a general review of state fiduciary law and specific fo-
cus on lock-ups in the context of state corporation law. It then fo-
cuses on the impact of federal securities law on the use of lock-ups
by examining the legislative history, regulatory action, and judicial
interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act and the Williams Act.
Finally, the comment proposes that federal law be expanded to in-
clude a federal fiduciary duty.
10. Faldin & France, Lock-up Arrangements, 14 REv. OF SEc. REG. 821 (1981); Na-
than, supra note 5, at 4.
11. See supra note 2.
12. See Bialkin, Court Cases Cloud Over Option Tactic in Takeovers, Legal Times
Wash., Jan. 11, 1982, at 19, col. 1.
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II. FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. State Law Controlling
Questions concerning violations of the directors' fiduciary duties
to shareholders are examined under applicable state law."8 There is
no fiduciary requirement for directors to either endorse or oppose a
tender offer." However, once a position is taken, any disclosure
made by the target's board of directors must comply with the re-
quirements of the federal securities law. 1 This common law counte-
nance of target silence concerning a tender offer has been modified
by Securities and Exchange Commission" Rule 14e-2 which re-
quires the target board of directors to communicate with the share-
holders concerning the merits of any tender offer.
1 7
In an unfriendly offer, incumbent management generally will
not remain silent, but will take affirmative steps to defeat the offer.
Although there has been some question and commentary regarding
management's right to oppose an unsolicited offer,"8 the better view
13. "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corpo-
rate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to shareholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). See 3 A. FLETCHER, CORPO-
RATIONS § 990 n.16 (1965).
14. Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1949). However, there may be a duty for
directors to oppose a tender offer if they believe that the aggressor will loot or misuse corporate
assets. See Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. I1. 1969).
15. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
16. Hereinafter cited as S.E.C.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1983). Position of subject company with respect to a tender
offer:
a. Position of subject company. As a means reasonably designed to prevent
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of
section 14(e) of the Act, the subject company, no later than 10 business days
from the date the tender offer is first published or sent or given, shall publish,
send or give to security holders a statement disclosing that the subject company:
1. Recommends acceptance or rejection of the bidder's tender offer;
2. Expresses no opinion and is remaining neutral toward the bidder's
tender offer; or
3. Is unable to take a position with respect to the bidder's tender offer.
Such statement shall also include the reason(s) for the position (including
the inability to take a position) disclosed therein.
b. Material change. If any material change occurs in the disclosure required
by paragraph (a) of this section, the subject company shall promptly publish,
send or give a statement disclosing such material change to security holders.
18. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
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is that management has not only a right, but a duty to defend against
an offer it feels is not in the shareholders' best interest."'
B. Business Judgment Rule
Historically, shareholder suits .claiming breach of state fiduciary
law have been decided under the business judgment rule. The rule
prohibits judicial interference with the decisions of a board of direc-
tors so long as those decisions are made in good faith and neither
fraud nor overreaching is present.20 The traditional rationale for the
rule has been that the courts, unlike business professionals, are not
competent to evaluate the numerous variables considered by the
board in reaching a decision."1
To enjoy the judicial deference of the business judgment rule,
the board of directors must show that some judgment was exercised.
To satisfy the showing for this de minimus scrutiny, the courts re-
quire the board of directors to evaluate the merits of any hostile offer
in good faith and determine that the offer is not in the shareholders'
best interest.. Once the board has fully and fairly evaluated the
merits of the offer and concluded that the terms are inadequate or
otherwise not in the shareholders' best interest, the board may take
whatever steps are legally available to oppose it.' 3
Since the business judgment rule developed under state corpora-
tion law, the scope and extent of the judicial scrutiny will vary from
state to state." Unlike the ordinary decisions of the board of direc-
19. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 288, 297; Northwest Indus., Inc. v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. at 712. See Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Direc-
tors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CoRp. L. REV. 107 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Herzel]; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
20. See generally Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 293; Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634
F.2d 690, 701-03 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). See generally Gilson,
supra note 9, at 821-31.
22. Comment, Defensive Tactics and the Fiduciary Obligations of the Target Board of
Directors, 7 J. Conp. L. 579, 583-86 (1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at
299.
23. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 288; Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d at 381. See generally Herzel, supra note 19.
24. Compare Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 293 (in the absence of a
showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or a gross abuse of discretion, the courts will
not interfere with the business judgment of the directors) and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("[a] board of directors enjoys the presumption of sound business
judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational
business purpose") with Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) and Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 94, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (transac-
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tors and management, target responses to hostile tender offers create
an inherent conflict of interest when the aggressor has expressed a
desire to replace existing management. The majority of the courts
addressing the issue have held, however, that this conflict of interest
is not sufficient to warrant judicial interference with management's
decisions.' 5 These courts have conceded that management's desire to
maintain control may be a motive in defending against a takeover.
But, to shift the burden of proof to the defendant directors to justify
their actions, those challenging the directors' actions must make a
factual showing that the impermissible motive predominated in the
decision to oppose. That is, absent a showing of fraud, bad faith,
gross overreaching or abuse of discretion on the part of the directors,
the courts will not interfere with the board's business judgment.3 6
This conflict of interest, and its ability to taint mangement's dis-
cretion, has been recognized by courts' 7 and commentators."8 Courts
have applied various standards to minimize the impact of the con-
flict. Some courts have examined the imcumbent board's actions in
light of the number of "independent" directors involved in reaching
the decision to oppose,' while other courts have shifted the burden
to the directors to establish a compelling business purpose in transac-
tions affecting control."0 However, these courts remain in the
minority.
C. Fiduciary Duties and the Formulated Lock-Up
Like other defensive tactics, the use of formulated lock-ups inev-
itably leads to allegations of fiduciary breaches, on the part of direc-
tors, for authorizing transactions having no business purpose other
tions involving control will be examined under a comprehensive rule of "inherent fairness from
the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein").
25. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 293-94.
26. Id.
27. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 300 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Tread-
way Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d at 382 ("[In nearly all of the cases treating stock transac-
tions intended to affect control, the directors who approved the transaction have had a real and
obvious interest in [retaining their control]. It is this interest which causes the burden of proof
to be shifted to the directors to demonstrate the propriety of the transactions.").
28. See Herzel, supra note 19, at 112-13; Comment, supra note 22, at 582.
29. "Independent" directors are those directors who do not also hold positions in man-
agement. The presumption of good faith that the business judgment rule affords is heightened
when the majority of the board consists of independent outside directors. Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 294.
30. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); Jones v. H.F. Ahman-
son & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
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than for defeating the offer.81 The response of the target board has
typically been that without the issuance of the lock-up, no competing
bid would have been made against the "inadequate""2 offer by the
aggressor. 8 Moreover, the directors generally contend that the busi-
ness judgment rule insulates their actions from judicial scrutiny."
When the price offered in the lock-up is near the fair market
value of the stock or assets, courts have been reluctant to find a
breach of duty. Instead, the courts have generally found that such
transactions fall within the purview of the business judgment rule."
Just as they must demonstrate with other defensive tactics that enjoy
judicial deference under the business judgment rule, directors are
generally required to show that some modicum of judgment was ex-
ercised in the context of a lock-up. Some courts, in addressing lock-
up situations, have distinguished between lock-ups involving target
stock and lock-ups involving target assets. The distinction is legiti-
mate because, although similar, the types of investigations that must
be done by the directors to satisfy their fiduciary burden are
different.
1. Lock-ups Involving Target Stock
The price of any treasury stock or authorized, but unissued
stock, that is to be sold or otherwise locked-up to a favored bidder
must be low enough to entice the bidder to purchase, thus scaring off
31. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ampo-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1981);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 271; Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d at
357 See generally Kramer, The Formulated Lock-up: New Technique Emerges in Takeover
Arena, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 3, 1981, at 19, col. 3.
32. After an aggressor makes an offer, management generally hires an investment
banker to generate a valuation of the shares. This valuation is usually disclosed by target
management as indicative of the inadequacy of the aggressor's offer. Such an internal valuation
can prove embarrassing to the target and any successful white knight in a back-end merger.
Excessive valuation by the investment banker may prove harmful to the target in any statutory
appraisal action arising out of the back-end freeze-out. See Bloomenthal, Lock-ups - Mobil
Wins Battle; Loses War, 4 SEc. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 97 (Feb. 1982). See generally, CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 1300-12 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (statutory appraisal rights). "Back-end
merger" and "back-end freeze-out" are defined infra at note 37.
33. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1981).
34. See Kramer, supra note 31, at 21, col. 1; Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp.
933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
35. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d at 383. The sale of an asset, which has
the result of making a company less attractive to a tender offeror, can be a proper exercise of
the directors' business judgment. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. at 951. Therefore, it
may be that the issue to focus on in a white knight lock-up transaction is not the directors'
opposition to the initial takeover proposal, but the fairness of the transaction facilitated by the
lock-up. Kramer, supra note 31, at 21, col. 1.
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any hostile bidder by successfully putting a large amount of target
stock in friendly hands. At the same time, if the price is too low,
shareholder allegations of breach of fiduciary duties will arise. To
satisfy state corporation law requirements that the consideration re-
ceived by a corporation be equal to the stock's fair value, the
purchase price of the shares is usually set at the current market
price, or, in the alternative, the purchase price is set at the same
price the white knight proposes to make in his public offering."'
While pricing the shares at the proposed public offering price may
produce a higher original cost, such a capital outlay is only tempo-
rary because the white knight will be able to reacquire the funds
expended through a back-end merger 7 of the target corporation into
the white knight. The only limitation on the white knight in this
friendly acquisition is the number of shares to be covered in the
agreement. The stock exchange rules usually restrict this quantity to
approximately twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding shares."
The directors satisfy their fiduciary duty by engaging an investment
banker who will render an opinion that the price offered by the
white knight is fair,as and certify that the sale would be in the best
interest of the corporation.
2. Lock-ups Involving Target Assets
In the sale of a principal asset, directors are only required to
show that the price was "fair." To this end, target management will
generally employ an investm~nt banking firm to generate an ap-
praisal. After receiving a favorable assessment by the appraisers, the
courts will defer to the business judgment of the directors.' 0 There is,
however, one limitation on the board of directors' ability to sell prin-
cipal assets: if the assets are large enough, there may be liability
36. Nathan, supra note 5, at 23.
37. A "back-end" or "second-phase" merger arises when an aggressor has obtained a
block of stock in excess of the amount required in the corporate charter and by-laws to effect a
merger; this amount is typically between 50% and 80%. At this point the merger can be au-
thorized solely by the aggressor voting its target stock in favor of the merger. Remaining share-
holders are bought out under the merger, usually with some form of stock or debt of the
aggressor. Such back-end mergers are subject to shareholder challenges as a "freeze-out" of the
minority interests, resulting in shareholder suits seeking to exercise their statutory appraisal
rights, if such rights exist.
38. Nathan, supra note 5, at 23. See NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-283 (1981).
39. Directors have a right to rely upon the advice and counsel of experts. Spirt v. Bech-
tel Co., 232 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1956); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. at 951.
40. "The sale of an asset that has the result of making a company less attractive to a
tender offeror can be a proper exercise of a board of directors' business judgment." Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. at 951.
[Vol. 24
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under state law for selling substantially all of the corporation's assets
without shareholder approval." Courts only require shareholder ap-
proval of a sale when the assests sold are "quantitatively vital to the
operation of the corporation," that is, when the sale "strikes at the
heart of the corporate existence and purpose.""' Hence, sales of as-
sets "representing at least twenty-six percent (26%) and possibly as
much as fifty percent (50%) of a corporation's total assets have been
deemed not a sale of substantially all of the corporation's assets."'43
In the lock-up area, then, it becomes obvious that the sale of an asset
as large as a subsidiary may not constitute a "sale of assets" if the
vendor is a large conglomerate.
Judicial interpretation of the business judgment rule has given
directors a virtual free rein. The board need not be concerned with
potential liability to shareholders so long as some business rationale
for the transaction has been demonstrated. Due largely to this judi-
cial deference, recent litigation has focused on lock-ups as a violation
of the antimanipulation provisions of the Williams Act.
III. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
A. The 1934 Act
The fundamental purpose of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act44 was to "substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor ."45 By requiring full disclosure, Con-
gress sought to put the investing public on the same footing as corpo-
rate insiders by equalizing the information available to both.4" The
41. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.76 (Page 1953); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1000-
1002 (West 1982).
42. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 606 (Del.Ch.), affd on other grounds,
316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974), quoted in Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. at 951.
43. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. at 951.
44. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act (hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act) is concerned
primarily with the regulation of securities in the secondary markets; that is, securities traded
through interstate commerce, as in the over-the-counter market, or securities traded on any
facility of any national exchange. See preamble of Pub. L. No. 73-291. In contrast, the 1933
Securities Act is generally concerned with regulating initial stock distributions from the issuer,
through the underwriters and selling groups, and ultimately to the investing public. See gener-
ally 1933 Securities Act. The Williams Act is an amendment of the 1934 Act.
45. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 467 (1977) (citations omitted). See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). See also 1968 HousE
REPORT, supra note I ("[Williams Act] designed to require full and fair disclosure for the
benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal oppor-
tunity to fairly present their case").
46. See Note, supra note 7, at 637.
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second principal concern of the 1934 Act was the prohibition of ma-
nipulative practices. Historically, the courts have emphasized the dis-
closure purpose of the 1934 Act; however, increasing attention is
now being paid to the substantive antimanipulation provisions.
There is no explicit definition of the term "manipulation" contained
in the 1934 Act; therefore, its meaning must be gleaned from both
the practices explicitly prohibited and the judicial pronouncements of
the term.
The two sections of the 1934 Act specifically addressing the
term "manipulation" are section 9,47 prohibiting manipulation of se-
curities prices, and section 10,48 regulating the use of manipulative
and deceptive devices. After satisfying the jurisdictional require-
ments,"' the S.E.C. is empowered by section 9 "to issue regulations
concerning pegging. . .[and] option . . . orders" as is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Section 10 regulates short sales and stop-loss orders51 as well as pro-
hibits such manipulative or deceptive devices as determined by the
S.E.C. To date, neither the Congress, the courts, nor the commenta-
tors have developed a clear consensus on the definition of "manipula-
tion." 5' It is against this back drop of the prior interpretation of
"manipulation" that the tender offer antimanipulation language of
the Williams Act must be examined.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
48. Id. § 78j.
49. The jurisdictional threshold of § 9 and § 10 requires that the offending act be com-
mitted "by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange. . . ." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECUR-
rIEs REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS, 779 (5th ed. 1982).
50. Note, supra note 7, at 638. A "pegging" transaction is one wherein the price of a
security is fixed, stabilized, or otherwise prevented from declining. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(b). An
"option" is a privilege existing in a person, for which he has paid money, which gives him an
irrevocable right to purchase (a "call" option), or to sell (a "put" option), or to purchase and
sell (a "straddle" option). Id. § 78i(b).
51. A "shortsale" is a transaction wherein a vendor sells shares that he does not yet own
or control, such shares typically being borrowed from a brokerage house to be replaced by the
vendor in the future. Id. § 78j(a). A "stop-loss" order is an order given to a stock broker to
buy or sell certain securities when the market price reaches a specified level. Id. § 78j(a).
52. "The term 'manipulation' was intended to apply to those activities occurring within
the market itself which intentionally distort the market's appraisal of value." Note, supra note
7, at 639. The term "manipulation" is "virtually a term of art when used in connection with
[the] securities' market ...refer[ring] generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched or-
ders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 476. Manipulation "connotes intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
ing the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
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B. The Williams Act
1. History and Legislative Intent
The Williams Act, which amends the 1934 Act,"" specifically
provides for full disclosure of pertinent information to shareholders
when control of a corporation is sought by a tender offeror, or when
a target corporation repurchases its own stock." This disclosure was
intended to be consistent with the disclosure requirements of the
1934 Act.55 As such, Congress viewed the Williams Act as filling the
gap in the securities law by requiring the same disclosures in a cash
tender offer as were then required in an exchange" tender offer.57
In drafting the legislation, Congress took great pains to create a reg-
ulatory scheme that would maintain neutrality. The goal of the au-
thors was:
[to avoid] tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.
It [was] designed to require full and fair disclosure for the bene-
fit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case."
2. Manipulation In Connection With a Tender Offer
Even though the courts have focused primarily on the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act, substantive provisions do exist. It
is these substantive antimanipulation provisions that have been em-
phasized by plaintiffs in attacking target defensive actions. In deter-
mining what acts and practices constitute manipulation in connection
with a tender offer, the legislative and judicial history of section
53. The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78
m-n (1964)) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78 m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1981)) [hereinafter cited as the Williams Act.]
54. See 1968 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, 2811; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 SENATE REPORT]; Note, supra note 7, at 640.
55. "As a disclosure bill, the [Williams Act) is consistent with the basic philosophy of
the federal securities laws that investors should be furnished with all material facts before
being asked to make an investment decision. This philosophy has been the keystone of federal
regulation for more than thirty years." 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 97 (testimony
of Ralph Saul, President of the American Stock Exchange).
56. In an exchange tender offer, the aggressor corporation offers some amount of its own
stock in exchange for each share of the target corporation that is tendered; in contrast, the cash
tender offer involves a payment of cash by the aggressor for each share tendered.
57. The purpose of the bill was to close the gap in an area of the securities law where
full disclosure was not yet required. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 1; 1968 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2814.
58. 1968 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (testimony of the Hon. Manuel F. Co-
hen, Comm'r of the Securities Exchange Comm.).
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14(e)"9 of the Williams Act must be critically examined.
a. Congressional History
Like the 1934 Act, the Williams Act contains no explicit defini-
tion of the term "manipulative." In addition, the legislative history is
conspicuously barren as to the intended meaning of manipulation
under section 14(e). At the Congressional hearings, testimony was
received expressing the view that strong antimanipulation provisions
were needed. Those who testified stated that, in light of the difficulty
and expense of proxy fights, strong substantive provisions would
provide the only viable mechanism to prevent incumbent manage-
ment from using unfair defensive tactics to entrench its position of
control.60 However, this view was not endorsed by Congress; rather,
the prevailing view was that problems of unfair defensive tactics and
entrenched management are better left to state control under the fi-
duciary laws. 1 The conclusion that the Williams Act was not in-
tended to regulate defensive tactics is buttressd by the dual purposes
of the Williams Act mentioned earlier: the requirement of full dis-
closure sufficient to allow the investor to make an intelligent deci-
sion," and the prohibition of manipulative devices designed to distort
the market price of shares to a level unrelated to natural supply and
demand."
The inference that Congress did not intend to regulate defensive
tactics is further supported by a negative implication arising from
59. Section 14(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or prac-
tices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78 n(e) (emphasis added).
60. See generally 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 116 (testimony of Robert
Mundheim, Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa.), 120 (testimony of Stanley Kaplan, Professor of
Law, Univ. of Chicago), 131 (testimony of A. Fleisher, Jr., Attorney at Law).
61. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 141 (federal regulation should not be ad-
dressing questions which are essentially matters for state law to determine). See 1968 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2813 ("It was urged during the hearings that takeover bids should
not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but
inefficient management. . . . The bill avoids tipping the balance . . . either in favor of man-
agement or in favor of the [offeror].").
62. See supra note 55.
63. See supra note 52.
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the scope of section 13(e)" of the Williams Act. This section regu-
lates stock repurchases by the issuer. The section 13(e) limitation is
significant because it implies that Congress intended to regulate only
the defensive tactic of issuer repurchases, even though Congress was
fully advised of the wide array of techniques used by target corpora-
tions in opposing hostile acquisitions." Also, even in this limited
area, section 13(e) emphasizes disclosure of the repurchases rather
than prohibition of the acquisitions.6
b. S.E.C. Regulations
The Congressional hearings on the 1968 legislation included
testimony by persons expressing the view that the S.E.C. should be
given wide rulemaking power to regulate the dynamic, everchanging
types of manipulative practices that are used by both aggressors and
targets.67 The S.E.C. itself, in statements before the 1967 Senate
hearings, noted both the disclosure and antimanipulation responsibil-
ities of the Commission." However, it was not until 1970 that Con-
gress delegated the job of determining what constitutes manipulation
to the S.E.C. by amending section 14(e) to give the Commission
rule-making authority." By assigning authority to the S.E.C., Con-
gress apparently realized that the dynamic nature of the tender offer
field mandated the use of the more flexible rule-making procedure;
that is, Congress recognized that the term "manipulative" must re-
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976).
65. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 137-38.
66. Note, supra note 7, at 642. See 1968 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2814.
67. "[I]n view of the almost infinite variety in terms of most tender offers, which are
limited only by the ingenuity of the offeror and his counsel, some flexibility through rule
making is needed [to adequately implement the antimanipulation language]." 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 5, at 18 (testimony of Hon. Manuel F. Cohen, Comm'r of the S.E.C.);
"[the S.E.C.] should be provided with the adequate tools to deal effectively with the various
techniques that have been developed, [and] are continuing to be devised, to initiate or to pre-
vent takeover bids. . . ." Id. at 16 (testimony of Hon. Manuel F. Cohen); "appropriate rules
[should] be adopted [to prevent management] from arranging bids or purchases to raise the
market so as to defeat a tender offer, and similarly, the maker of an offer should be prevented
from arranging offers or sales to depress the market or keep a ceiling on it in order to make
the tender offer attractive." Id. at 131 (prepared statement by A. Fleisher, Jr.).
68. The Commission's responsibility should be limited to requiring appropriate disclos-
ure [and] to guarding against deceptive and unfair devices designed to coerce or prevent action.
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 16 (statement of Hon. Manuel F. Cohen, Comm'r of
S.E.C.).
69. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), amended section 14(e) of the Williams
Act by adding "The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regu-
lations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as
are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
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main flexible.70 Senator Williams, co-sponsor of the bill, emphasized
this Congressional recognition when he stated: "[The amendment]
would give the Commission rule-making power with respect to
fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative acts used in tender offers.
The techniques currently being used in the offers have become in-
creasingly sophisticated and they change rapidly. This is particularly
true when the takeover is resisted by incumbent management.17
Pursuant to its Congressional grant of authority, the Commis-
sion has issued rules designed to prevent manipulative acts or prac-
tices within the meaning of section 14(e). However, none of these
rules address any acts or practices remotely related to the use of
lock-ups.72
c. Judicial Interpretation
With the failure of Congress and the Commission to adequately
define the term "manipulation," practitioners have been relegated to
extracting a composite definition from the case law. Although the
courts have yet to devise a workable formula for determining the
existence of manipulation in connection with a tender offer, 8 most
courts and commentators have viewed the manipulative language of
section 14(e) as having the same meaning as the manipulative lan-
guage of section 10(b) in the 1934 Act.7 4
Consistent with the recognition of the similarity in the usage of
70. "The term 'manipulative' must remain flexible in the face of new techniques which
artificially affect securities markets." Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374
(6th Cir. 1981); "No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenius devices that
might be used to manipulate securities prices." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at
477.
71. 116 CONG. REc. 29252 (1970) (statement by Senator Williams).
72. The rules currently in existence have dealt largely with the disclosure area, although
some provisions pertaining to amendments of the terms of an outstanding tender offer have
also been made.
73. Ferrara and Phillips, Courts Struggle With "Manipulative Practices," L.A. Daily
J., May 7, 1982, at 4, col. 13.
74. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 373 ("Section 10(b) concerns the
sale and purchase of securities rather than tender offers, but its antimanipulation language is
similar to that of § 14(e)."); Note, supra note 7, at 642 ("there is (an] indication in the
legislative history of the Williams Act that the term ["manipulative"] was intended to be inter-
preted under the 1934 Act"). But see 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 141-42 (does the
language in Rule lOb-5 (forbidding practices which "would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person"), § 14(e) (forbidding "such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative"), § 10b (forbidding the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance"), and Rule 14a-9 (forbidding "false or misleading" statements or omissions in proxy
situations) mean essentially the same thing, or are any differences in meaning accounted for by
differing purposes of these sections?) (testimony by W. H. Painter, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Mo.).
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the term in section 10(b) and section 14(e), most courts have chosen
to follow the mandate of Santa Fe Indus. v. Green.7 5 In Santa Fe,
the controlling shareholder notified the minority shareholders that a
short-form merger 7  between it and the controlled corporation pro-
vided all shareholders with the information needed to perfect their
state law appraisal rights. Certain minority shareholders objected to
the terms of the merger, but chose not to pursue their appraisal rem-
edy in state court. Instead, they brought suit under the federal secur-
ities law asserting that effecting a merger, where the sole purpose
was to eliminate minority interest, lacked any justifiable business
purpose and thus constituted a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934
Act.
While the Supreme Court recognized that the term "manipula-
tion" is "virtually a term of art when used in connection with securi-
ties markets,"' 77 it stated that the antimanipulation language of the
federal securities law was not intended to "regulate transactions
which constitute no more than internal corporation mismanage-
ment. '7  The Court reaffirmed its previous position that
"[clorporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to shareholders, state law will govern the internal af-
fairs of the corporation. '79 The Court reasoned that this standard
balances the states' right to control their own corporations while re-
serving the congressional right to regulate when there is an expressed
need to infringe upon state autonomy.
In addressing the breadth and scope of the term "manipula-
tion," the Santa Fe Court recognized that "Congress meant to pro-
hibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manip-
ulate securities prices."80 However, throughout this and other
Supreme Court opinions it has been repeatedly stressed that the term
75. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
76. A short form merger is a procedure whereby a controlling corporation that owns
some statutorily defined supermajority of the subsidiary's stock, can effect a merger of the
subsidiary into the controlling corporation without the need of the approval of the sharehold-
ers; all that is required is that notice of the merger be given to the shareholders. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. CORP., § 253 (1967); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(b) (West 1982).
77. 430 U.S. at 476 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199).
78. 430 U.S. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
79. 430 U.S. at 479 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (emphasis in the
original)).
80. 430 U.S. at 477.
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"manipulation" is to be viewed in light of any artificial effect the act
or practice in question may have on the price of security.8 1 Further,
the Court has emphasized that the fundamental purpose of the 1934
Act has been the implementation of a "'philosophy of full disclos-
ure;' once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the
terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the
statute. 
''8
Following the Supreme Court's thorough examination of the
antimanipulation language contained in section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, numerous lower courts applied the same reasoning and inter-
pretation to the antimanipulation language contained in the Wil-
liams Act.88 Where section 10(b) was intended to prohibit manipula-
tion in the sales of securities effected through a market or exchange,
section 14(e) was intended to prohibit similar manipulation in con-
nection with public solicitations for tenders that generally are not
made through an exchange or established market. It was this gap in
the area of tender efforts that Congress intended to fill with the Wil-
liams Act." Thus, it is clear that the Court will not allow the fed-
eral securities law to be used to create a federal fiduciary duty;
rather, the Court will relegate "fairness" questions to the state courts
for determination under applicable state law.
In sum, it seems clear that no action will lie under section 14(e)
against management's use of conventional defensive tactics so long as
full and fair disclosure is made and investors have not been misled.
Recent cases, however, have sought to distinguish lock-ups from con-
ventional defensive tactics. In evaluating the lock-ups in the tender
offer settings, courts have looked to the prior history of state corpora-
tion law and federal securities law for guidance.
C. Section 14(e) and the Formulated Lock-up
1. Manipulation According to Mobil
In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 5 Mobil, as the aggressor,
made a public tender offer for 40 million Marathon shares at $85.00
81. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195, 199 n.21; Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 43 (1977).
82. 430 U.S. at 478 (quoting S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Reserch Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963)).
83. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 283; Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 669 F.2d at 373; Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 947
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
84. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
85. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
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per share, stating its intention to acquire the balance through a back-
end merger. Marathon, in seeking to avoid the hostile takeover, in-
duced U.S. Steel to make an offer for fifty-one percent of Marathon
at $125.00 per share by giving U.S. Steel a stock option to purchase
ten million authorized, but unissued, shares and an asset option to
purchase Marathon's forty-eight percent interest in the Yates Oil
and Gas Field in Texas. Mobil brought suit seeking to enjoin the
exercise of the options, asserting that they were "manipulative"
within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Williams Act.In granting the injunction, the Mobil court recognized that the
term "manipulative" is not defined in the Securities Exchange Act
nor in the Williams Act. The Mobil court, however, was swift to
note that "the Supreme Court has . . . indicated that manipulation
is an affecting of the market price for, or price of, securities by artifi-
cial means, i.e., means unrelated to the natural forces of supply and
demand."" With this general definition in mind, the court observed
that, in order to be effective, "the term 'manipulative' must remain
flexible in the face of new techniques which artificially affect securi-
ties markets."8 Drawing from sparse legislative history, the court
buttressed its "flexibility" interpretation by noting that "[n]o doubt
Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that
might be used to manipulate securities prices.""
The Mobil court conceded that the 1934 Act, generally, and the
Williams Act, specifically, were aimed at disclosure. However, the
court noted that substantive provisions exist in the Williams Act. Ac-
knowledging the Supreme Court's observation in Santa Fe that
"nondisclosure is usually essential to the success of a manipulative
scheme,""' the Mobil court went on to add that "disclosure alone
does not always mean there is no manipualtion."" Further, the Mo-
bil court observed that "to find compliance with section 14(e) solely
by the full disclosure of a manipulative device as a fait accompli
would be to read the 'manipulative acts and practices' language com-
pletely out of the Williams Act." 91 Instead, the court asserted that
86. Id. at 374 (emphasis in the original).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 477).
89. 430 U.S. at 477.
90. 669 F.2d at 376. Such a realization has received some support. See Ferrara and
Phillips, supra note 73 ("The Williams Act is not merely a disclosure statute with only a few
minor esoteric substantive provisions.").
91. 669 F.2d at 377. "Santa Fe ... cannot be taken to mean that conduct that falls
within the special meaning of 'manipulative' is legal so long as it is fully disclosed." Id. at 376.
See Bloomenthal, supra note 32, at 99.
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Santa Fe stood for the proposition that only deceptive or manipula-
tive practices had to be shown in order to fall within the purview of
section 14(e). The fact that the offending acts did not involve false or
misleading statements did not necessarily preclude them from being
manipulative.9" In its reasoning, the Mobil court opined that the
price ceiling effect and the anticompetitive effect of the options were
indicative of manipulation, in violation of section 14(e).
a. Price Ceiling Effect
As part of the consideration for entering into a merger agree-
ment, U.S. Steel required an irrevocable option to purchase ten mil-
lion authorized, but unissued shares, of Marathon stock and an op-
tion to purchase Marathon's oil and mineral rights in Yates Field
for $2.8 billion." At trial, the fact-finder expressly found that the
$2.8 billion price was fair."
On appeal, the Mobil court viewed the stock and asset options
as creating an artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market for
Marathon shares. Thus, the court reasoned that the creation of a
price ceiling constituted manipulation within the meaning of section
14(e). The effect of the options was to create a ceiling by differenti-
ating the "basket of assets" for which Mobil and U.S. Steel would be
bidding. Since U.S. Steel paid no cash consideration for the option, it
was free to bid the fair value of all Marathon assets, including Yates
Field. However, in valuing the assets of the target, Mobil was pre-
vented from attaching a value to Yates Field in excess of the $2.8
billion option price because, should Mobil be successful in its take-
over attempt such that U.S. Steel would choose to exercise its option,
the amount realized by Mobil would be the predetermined option
price of $2.8 billion. Any excessive valuation by Mobil could not be
recovered. The Mobil court considered this fact significant when it
noted that, although the $2.8 billion was "fair" in the context of
satisfying the directors' fiduciary duty to acquire an adequate return
on the sale of assets, there was evidence that the field may have been
worth as much as $3.6 billion.95 As such, other bidders might have
valued the Yates Field reserves at a higher value than $2.8 billion,
but were essentially prevented from doing so by the existence of the
options." Considering the ceiling effect on bidding created by the
92. Bloomenthal, supra note 32, at 99.
93. 669 F.2d at 367.
94. Id. at 375.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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options, the court concluded that:
the only effect of [the] option [on Yates Field] could be to deter
Mobil and any other tender offeror from competing with [U.S.
Steel] in an auction for control of Marathon. Others cannot
compete on par with [U.S. Steel]; its bid of $125.00 per share
thus amounts to an artificial price ceiling on the value the Mar-
athon shareholders can receive for their shares."
b. Anticompetitive Effects
In a related argument, the Mobil court recognized that the ceil-
ing effect of the lock-ups also created a restraint on competitive bid-
ding for the shares in violation of section 14(e). While the Mobil
court was not directly concerned with the anticompetitive effect the
lock-up would have on Mobil per se, it was concerned with the indi-
rect effect that a reduction in competitive bidding would have on the
ultimate value paid to the Marathon shareholders. The court stated
that "[t]he purpose of the Williams Act, protection of the sharehold-
ers, requires that Mobil and any other interested bidder be permitted
an equal opportunity to compete in the marketplace" '' for Marathon
shares, and that Mobil's adverse posture to Marathon would insure
full and rigorous representation of the Marathon shareholders in the
equitable action. Thus, even though the Supreme Court has stated
that tender offerors are not the intended beneficiaries of the Wil-
liams Act,99 the Mobil court held that the injunction was needed to
protect the interests of the Marathon shareholders. The Court was
not concerned with the ultimate price, but reasoned that a restoration
of the competitive bidding system would generate a fair appraisal of
the assets once the artificial manipulation was removed. 00
Independent of, and in addition to, the deterrent effect on com-
petition of the asset option, the Mobil court concluded that the size of
the stock options given to U.S. Steel inhibited competition to the
point of being manipulative.' Further, the fact that the options
97. Id.
98. Id. at 376.
99. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 28.
100. "Our task under the Williams Act is not to speculate about what price the Mara-
thon shareholders might have been offered if the natural market forces existed in this tender
offer contest, but rather to enforce the mandate of section 14(e) against manipulation of the
market." 669 F.2d at 376.
101. "[Tihe stock option was large enough in this takeover contest to serve as an artifi-
cial and significant deterrent to competitive bidding for a controlling block of Marathon
shares." Id. at 375. "The size and price of the stock option, together with the fact that it was
granted to [U.S. Steel], a tender offeror, prevented all others from competing on par with [U.S.
Steel] for a controlling block of Marathon shares, and tipped the scales decidedly in favor of
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were granted to a competing tender offeror was sufficient to cause
the court to observe that the assets worked to "tip the scales decid-
edly in favor of" U.S. Steel.1 02 Thus, the stock option "artificially
and significantly discouraged competitive bidding for the Marathon
shares."1108
Commentators have questioned the anticompetitive rationale of
Mobil. In their view, the central issue is whether the options serve
the critical function of bringing a competitive bidder into the picture.
That is, were the options essential to another bidder to compete? If
so, the options should not be considered anticompetitive.'"
c. Not a Rule of Decision
The Mobil court did not purport to "define a rule of decision
for all claims of manipulation under the Williams Act, or indeed for
all forms of options which might be claimed to 'lock-up' takeover
battles or otherwise discourage competing tender offers. 1 05 Rather,
the court stated that "under the circumstances of this particular
case ' " the Yates Field option and the stock option "individually
and together [were] 'manipulative' as that term is used in section
14(e)." 107
Subsequent courts and commentators who have expressed disa-
greement with the Mobil rationale have been quick to capitalize
upon the admittedly factual basis of the Mobil decision by distin-
guishing their own facts from those in Mobil and by narrowly read-
ing the Mobil court's holding. '
2. Expansion of the "Manipulative" Language
Two years after Mobil, the Second Circuit had the opportunity
[U.S. Steel]." Id. at 376.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ferrara and Phillips, supra note 73; Bialkin, supra note 12, at col. 3.
105. 669 F.2d at 377.
106. Id. at 375.
107. Id. at 374.
108. Mobil was not the only case to commingle the federal securities law and state cor-
poration law. In Joseph E. Seagram and Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
Seagram made a public tender offer to purchase shares of St. Joe Minerals Corporation at
$45.00 per share. After trying numerous defensive techniques to thwart the offer, the target
announced that it would sell the assets of the company to circumvent Seagram's offer. The
court enjoined the sales pending a final determination on the merits of Seagram's § 14(e)
claim. Even though the court expressly set forth that it was "fully mindful of the teachings of
the Santa Fe case and its impact on the business judgment doctrine and state law principles,"
the Seagram court proceeded to apply the state law standard for fiduciary duty breaches under
the color of federal antimanipulation law. The concerted act of intentionally liquidating corpo-
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to examine the use of an option arrangement in a formulated lock-up
in Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc.109
In Data Probe, Datatab approached CRC Information Systems,
Inc. (CRC) to inquire whether CRC was interested in purchasing
the financially troubled Datatab. Negotiations between the two
culminated in a proposed merger agreement whereby CRC would
purchase all of the outstanding Datatab stock at $1.00 per share.
Following the formal announcement of the merger, Data Probe
made a cash tender offer for all Datatab stock at $1.25 per share.
The offer was conditioned upon a rejection of the sale-by-merger
agreement at the upcoming Datatab shareholders' meeting. In re-
sponse to this hostile tender offer, CRC raised its purchase price to
$1.40 per share; this modified offer was conditioned upon Datatab
granting to CRC an irrevocable one-year option to purchase author-
ized, but unissued, Datatab stock in an amount equal to 200% of the
then outstanding shares. Datatab management accepted this revised
offer and granted the irrevocable option that, in effect, guaranteed
CRC the power to accomplish the proposed merger even if disap-
proved by the Datatab shareholders. Data Probe countered by rais-
ing its tender offer price to $1.55 and conditioning its acceptance of
shares upon a corporate or judicial invalidation of the merger agree-
ment. Simultaneously with the modification of its offer, Data Probe
filed an action to enjoin the merger alleging inter alia, that the
merger constituted a lock-up arrangement amounting to a violation
of the antimanipulation language of section 14(e)."1
The Data Probe court determined that a complete reading of
the legislative history and judicial precedent compelled enforcement
of the dual requirements of section 14(e). The court read the Wil-
liams Act to impose two duties upon the tender offerors: first, to
provide full and adequate disclosure; and second, to "refrain from
any conduct that unduly impedes the shareholders' exercise of the
decision-making prerogative guaranteed to them by Congress." ' As
such, the court fashioned a rule that "only those forms of 'manipula-
tive' conduct that unduly interfere with the tender offer process vio-
rate assets was viewed by the court as going beyond the traditional fiduciary criterion, so as to
constitute an improper manipulation of the market. Despite its apparent support for the Mobil
decision, Seagram was not cited by the Mobil court, nor have subsequent cases sought to dis-
tinguish it.
109. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,541 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
110. Id. at 96,564-68.
111. Id. at 96,567-68.
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late the Act." '
The court asserted that judicial precedent clearly established the
federal authority to enforce the Williams Act beyond requiring mere
disclosure.11 ' Although it must be conceded that the regulations"1 4
and the judicial authority" 5 have not limited themselves solely to
requiring disclosure, the contention that the Williams Act extends to
a judicial examination of tender offeror acts that interfere with the
exercise of shareholder decision-making is clearly in conflict with
prior Supreme Court teachings. Any such examination would be, in
reality, a judicial review of the substantive fairness of the actions and
offers of the respective parties. Inspection into the substantive fair-
ness of the tender offers has repeatedly been viewed by the Court as
falling outside of the proscription of the federal securities laws and
within the realm of state fiduciary duty. 1 Thus, the Data Probe
court's test amounts to a distortion of the well-defined disclosure
purpose of the Williams Act. 1 '
In addition, the Data Probe court saw the legislative history of
the Williams Act as supporting, not restricting, the right of incum-
bent management to oppose tender offers through the use of defen-
sive tactics.1 8 This, too, appears to be in conflict with the view
adopted by Congress and the commentators that the statute was in-
tended to be neutral. Congress determined that problems of unfair
defensive tactics and entrenched management were better left to state
control under the fiduciary laws.119 The Data Probe court, however,
took offense to the oft-stated assumption that the "manipulative"
language of section 14(e) was to be read in pari material with the
similar language in section 10(b).' 20 As the Data Probe court read
112. d. at 96,573. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) (Issn. 0162-1084) at 3 (the test
"invalidat[es] acts that unduly obstruct the exercise of informed shareholder choice. These acts
which undermine or unduly obstruct a tender offer, constitute conduct deemed 'manipulative'
by the Williams Act.").
113. FED. SEC. L. REP. at 96,570.
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14.
115. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. at 476 ("['manipulation'] generally refers to practices such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity.").
116. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. See also Panter v. Marshall Field,
646 F.2d at 287 ("the 'philosophy of full disclosure' embodied in the Securities Exchange Act
...requires proof of an element of deception, and does not provide a remedy for the breach of
a fiduciary duty a director owes his corporation and its shareholders under state law.").
117. See supra note 55.
118. FED. SEC. L. REP. at 96,568-69.
119. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
120. FED. SEC. L. REP. at 96,573. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 75.
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the history, the similarity between sections 10(b) and 14(e) applied
only to their disclosure provisions; the manipulative language of the
two sections was to be read in light of the underlying purposes of the
respective sections.121
The Data Probe court interpreted the Williams Act as requir-
ing a different kind of antimanipulation protection than was re-
quired under the 1934 Act: 2
Section 10(b) is directed at insuring informed investment deci-
sion through "regulating trading markets, requiring disclosure
and prohibiting deception and classic kinds of market manipula-
tions." [Citations]. The Williams Act focuses on the narrower
and more specific problem of "protection of investors who are
confronted by a cash tender offer." ''
Thus, even though the Data Probe court saw the differing underly-
ing purposes of the two acts as warranting an examination of
whether the parties "unduly interfer[ed] with the tender offer pro-
cess," 1 4 the court asserted that Data Probe and Mobil could not be
read to establish a federal fiduciary duty." 5 The court buttressed
this assertion by stating that under its purported test, good faith on
the part of the tender offeror would be irrelevant; that is, although
management's good faith might be a defense to state claims, such as
fiduciary breach, it would be unpersuasive in avoiding liability under
section 14(e)." 6 In essence, the Data Probe strict liability test is no
more than a feeble attempt to circumvent the recognition in Santa Fe
that, to date, there is no federal fiduciary duty, either judicially cre-
ated or statutorily enacted." 7
Although the Data Probe court's approach, like the approach
employed by Mobil, has emotional appeal, its reading of the legisla-
tive history and judicial precedent is similarly flawed and unpersua-
sive. Its holding ignores the plain language of the Supreme Court in
121. FED. SEC. L. REP. at 1 96,573.
122. Id. at 96,567. However, even the leading precedent in support of Data Probe's
expansive reading of section 14(e) ackowledged the controlling similarity between the language
of the Williams Act and the language of the 1934 Act. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
669 F.2d at 373.
123. FED. SEC. L. REP. at 96,567.
124. Id. at 1 96,573.
125. Id. at 96,566-67.
126. Id. at 1 96,574. Further, while good faith is a defense to a claim of breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, it may not be a defense to a claim of breach of the fiduciary duty of
due care. Under the duty of due care, directors are obligated to undertake a reasonable exami-
nation before their actions will be insulated under the business judgment rule.
127. 430 U.S. at 479-80.
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Chris-Craft that "[the Williams Act] is designed soley to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors."12 In addition, lan-
guage in Santa Fe to the effect that "once full and fair disclosure has
occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a
tangential concern of the statute"1" contradicts the Data Probe
court's contention that the securities laws contemplate a substantive
evaluation of the terms. If such a vast prohibition were not intended,
the Supreme Court could have easily narrowed the impact of its de-
cisions by avoiding the use of such words as "solely" and "tangen-
tial." To dismiss such wide sweeping language without any substan-
tial legislative history or judicial precedent is to stretch judicial
interpretation to the limit, in direct contradiction to the doctrine of
stare decisis.
It follows, then, that the holding of Santa Fe must control: that
absent some misrepresentation or omission, a cause of action under
the federal securities law will not lie for a claim amounting to no
more than a breach of a state law fiduciary duty.
3. Erosion by Subsequent Cases
In Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 130 the Icahn investment
group, a dissident faction of Marshall Field shareholders, was pur-
suing a plan of acquisition of Marshall Field and Company through
open market purchases. After acquiring five percent (5%) of Mar-
shall Field & Company, the acquiring group filed a disclosure state-
ment pursuant to section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. Field
management actively sought, and found, a white knight in BATUS,
Inc., which announced a public tender offer for Field shares. Prior to
the announced tender offer, Field and BATUS entered a stock
purchase agreement, under which Field would sell two million
shares of treasury stock to BATUS; in addition, Field conferred a
right of first refusal on BATUS for the purchase of certain real
properties owned by Field. The Icahn group sought a temporary re-
straining order against the tender offer. In denying the motion, the
Icahn court distinguished the facts from those present in Mobil. The
court noted that the stock purchase contract, although defeasible
under certain circumstances, was not set at a bargain price.181 The
purchase price proposed by BATUS was identical to the price it
made in its public tender offer. In contrast, the option price for the
128. 430 U.S. at 31 (emphasizing 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967).
129. 430 U.S. at 478.
130. 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
131. Id. at 422.
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target shares in Mobil was substantially below the subsequent price
in the white knight's public offering. Thus, the price differential in
Mobil, viewed by the court as indicative of a bargain price, was not
present in Icahn. Similarly, the right of first refusal on the target's
real properties was noted by the Icahn court as not intended to effec-
tuate a sale below market price.13' This was markedly different from
the facts in Mobil where the court observed that the Yates Field asset
may have been valued by others greatly in excess of the $2.8 billion
option price.
Furthermore, the Icahn court stated that Mobil's expansive
reading of the "manipulative" language in section 14(e) "could un-
duly interfere with the right of company management to combat a
takeover attempt that it believe[d] in good faith to be harmful to its
shareholders. ' " 8 Thus, the Icahn court made clear that director lia-
bility could only result if the facts constituted a violation of the direc-
tors' fiduciary duties to the shareholders. The court implicitly viewed
the Mobil decision as encroaching on the area of state corporation
law which was expressly exempted from regulation under the Wil-
liams Act by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe.l" Further, the Icahn
court concluded that the assertion in Mobil that the use of a lock-up
option constituted a violation of section 14(e), even if it was fully
disclosed, represented a "questionable legal theory. '"18
Along this same line, critics have expressed confusion over the
Mobil court's apparent commingling of the concepts of federal secur-
ities law and state fiduciary duty,'" particularly in light of the
court's express finding of good faith and loyalty by the Marathon
directors.187 While nearly all believe that the antimanipulation pro-
visions should be given some substantive bite, the critics are in accord
132. Id. Also, although not noted by the Icahn court, the affirmative nature of an option
to purchase, as compared with a right of first refusal, factually distinguishes Mobil from Icahn.
That is, in Mobil the right of U.S. Steel to compel sale by the excercise of its option worked to
create differentiated "basket of assets" on which the competing tender offerors were bidding.
In Icahn, however, BATUS's right of first refusal only granted the holder of the right the
power to acquire the assets, if and only if, Field decided to sell. Thus, BATUS could not
compel the sale as could U.S. Steel, and hence, the right of first refusal did not result in
differing "baskets of assets." See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
135. 537 F. Supp. at 422.
136. "This writer confesses confusion regarding the [Mobil court's] conclusions. It is
very difficult to see how conduct found to be completely lawful as a matter of corporate re-
sponsibility, and fully disclosed, can constitute manipulation." Bialkin, supra note 12, at col. 3.
137. 669 F.2d at 377.
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
that Mobil's expansive reading is unfounded and unpersuasive.' a
While the district court in New York was deciding Icahn, the
district court in Illinois was reviewing another lock-up in Whittaker
Corporation v. Edgar.1 49 Whittaker involved a motion by a tender
offeror to enjoin the target from disposing of stock or assets of the
target's wholly-owned subsidiary. Distinguishing the outright sale
involved in Whittaker from the option to purchase in Mobil, the
court denied the motion.""0 Despite the fact that the aggressor had
indicated on numerous occasions that it considered the target's sub-
sidiary as the major attraction in its bid, the Whittaker court chose to
narrowly construe Mobil. The Whittaker court noted that "the lock-
up options found by the Mobil court to be in violation of section
14(e) of the Williams Act are not present in the case before the
court."14 Indeed, while observing that a "sale of a substantial asset
by a corporation in the face of a hostile tender offer standing alone is
not a violation of section 14(e) '114' the court went on to amplify in a
footnote that such an action may constitute a breach of the state fidu-
ciary duty. 14' Thus, the Whittaker court, like the Icahn court, made
clear that the matters presented were better analyzed under the state
corporation law than by distorting the federal securities law to create
a cause of action.
Since a sale rather than an option was involved, the Whittaker
court emphasized that there was no price ceiling effect because "any
potential bidders [would] be bidding for [the target] without [the
subsidiary]." 14' The court was also convinced that the sale created no
ceiling because the aggressor failed to revise its offer for the target in
an attempt to compete.14' The court supported its conclusion that
there was no ceiling created by noting a factual distinction between
the Whittaker facts and the facts of Mobil. In Mobil, the aggressor
made a subsequent competing bid for Marathon shares, conditioned
138. "The [Mobil] court's legal analysis was not very persuasive. The court recognized
that the Supreme Court had construed the term 'manipulation' narrowly in the context of
10(b) and cited no case law or legislative history for a broader reading of 14(e)." Ferrara and
Phillips, supra note 73. "While the decision may represent good policy in terms of regulating
'lock-ups' it is questionable whether the expansive interpretation of the term 'manipulative'
was intended by Congress." Bloomenthal, supra note 32, at 99.
139. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I1. 1982), affd mem., No. 82-1305 and No. 82-1307 (7th
Cir. 1982).
140. 535 F. Supp. at 949.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 949 n.7.
144. Id. at 949.
145. Id.
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expressly upon the options to U.S. Steel being declared void. In
Whittaker, the court noted, the aggressor made no attempt to modify
its bid in order to compete. The lack of any conditional curative act
in Whittaker was viewed as indicative of the nonexistence of any
ceiling effect of the lock-up.
The aggressor in Whittaker contended that the outright sale in
the case had the same deterrent effect in competitive bidding as the
options had in the Mobil case. The Whittaker court, however, coun-
tenanced the outright sale of a substantial asset by a target corpora-
tion as being "part of healthy market activity, especially in light of
the fact that [the target] would receive more for [the subsidiary] in
sale . . . than what [the subsidiary] was valued at by [the aggressor]
.. . 146 Finally, the Whittaker court stated that "a sale of a sub-
stantial asset by a corporation in the face of a hostile tender offer
standing alone is not a violation of section 14(e). '147
Both Whittaker and Icahn questioned the precedential validity
of Mobil,14" and distinguished their own facts from the events in Mo-
bil.1 " As these cases illustrate, serious questions remain concerning
lock-ups as a violation of the antimanipulation provisions of the Wil-
liams Act. Few would argue that the substantive provisions of section
14(e) are meaningless; however, many would take exception to Mo-
bil's expansive interpretation of the section's "manipulative" lan-
guage. With a number of Supreme Court opinions implying that the
manipulation language of section 14(e) was intended to cover acts
and practices that distort the market price for stock, the Mobil court
substantially expanded on this generally accepted meaning without
any precedent or supporting legislative history."" In effect, both the
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. at 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. at 949.
149. "[E]ven if the Mobil decision represented controlling law, it does not compel an
injunction on these facts." 537 F. Supp. at 422. "[T]he lock-up options [of Mobil] are not
present in the case before the court." 535 F. Supp. at 949.
150. See Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 73; Bloomenthal, supra note 32, at 99. Simi-
larly, the Seagram court's interpretation that the target's acts were a flagrant breach of the
fiduciary duty, constituting improper market manipulation is an unprecedented and unwar-
ranted reading of the antimanipulation language of section 14(e). Clearly, the court's recitation
of the teachings of Santa Fe amounted to nothing more than lip service. See supra note 108.
Seagram, however, has remained largely an aberration. It has not been cited with ap-
proval, nor have courts distinguished the decision in subsequent cases. Similarly, the critics
have largely ignored the opinion, indicating that the decision has little, if any, legal signifi-
cance. Although the Seagram opinion has received scant critical review, at least one commenta-
tor saw the liquidation sales in Seagram as constituting "the ultimate 'manipulative' device."
Hochman, A Hostile Tender Offer: Does It Suspend the Rules?, 4 Nat'l L.J., March 29, 1982,
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Mobil and Data Probe courts have created a violation of the federal
securities law out of what is essentially a breach of the state law
fiduciary duty in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court's man-
date in Santa Fe.15 1
The Mobil court's rationale for finding a price ceiling as a re-
sult of the manipulative acts and practices erroneously assumes a
ceteris paribus'" condition with respect to Marathon's other assets
in that it assumes that Mobil and U.S. Steel valued the balance of
Marathon's assets in the same amount. However, there was no fac-
tual finding to this effect, nor could there be one. The court's obser-
vation that Yates Field may have been valued at more than $2.8
billion by other bidders implies that other bidders may have valued
Marathon's refineries, equipment, and other fixed assets at different
values. Therefore, the option on Yates Field did not create a price
ceiling since the bidders were free to value the remaining assets dif-
ferently; rather, the option had the effect of retarding the price Mar-
athon shareholders would have received by fixing the value of only
one of Marathon's assets. While the Whittaker court did not deline-
ate this distinction, it suggested something similar when it noted that
even though there was an outright sale of one of the target's assets,
the competitors were free to bid what they liked for the target's re-
maining assets."' However stated, the critical factor, as viewed by
the Mobil court, appears to be that the options worked to the detri-
ment of Marathon shareholders who would have enjoyed a higher
price for their shares in an open, competitive bid.
In attempting to distinguish Mobil, Whittaker may have indi-
rectly supported Mobil. The Whittaker court's assertion that the sale
of a substantial asset by a corporation in the face of a hostile tender
offer, standing alone, is not a violation of section 14(e) 1" may imply
that the sale of a substantial asset plus some extra increment of ac-
tivity will constitute a violation of section 14(e). If that is so, then
perhaps the asset option, which could be considered equivalent to a
sale, plus the sizable stock option would be sufficient interference to
constitute manipulation within the meaning of the Williams Act.
at 25, col. 1.
151. 430 U.S. at 476.
152. Literally translated, "ceteris paribus" means "all other things being equal." The
ceteris paribus condition is used to isolate and analyze the effect on the tender offer price
resulting from the change in one variable, in this case Yates Field, while holding all other
factors constant.
153. 535 F. Supp. at 949.
154. Id.
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Thus, Mobil and Whittaker may be read to be consistent.
The Mobil court, however, correctly addressed the stock and as-
set options separately. Although similar in appearance, there are im-
portant differences between the two types of options. As previously
stated, the asset option had the effect of materially altering the "bas-
ket of assets" for which Mobil could bid, creating a corresponding
reduction in price that Mobil would be willing to pay. The effect on
price is arguably manipulative, even though such a situation may
not have been the type of manipulation envisioned by Congress. In
contrast, the stock option does not reduce the basket of assets availa-
ble to a bidder; all it does is place a large block of stock in friendly
hands.1"5 Icahn implied that stock sales to white knights were ex-
actly the kind of technique target management would need to combat
an attempt it believed harmful to the shareholders. As such, the
Icahn court made clear that federal securities law must not be read
to bar management action taken in the best interest of the share-
holder. Rather, the shareholder must show a breach of the fiduciary
duty before liability will attach. The result of placement of a large
block of stock in friendly hands is that an aggressor must raise his
bid for the remaining shares if it is to induce those remaining share-
holders to tender. While this may obviously be seen to have an an-
ticompetitive effect on the aggressor, it has a beneficial effect on the
target shareholders. Recalling the Supreme Court's prior teaching
that tender offerors are not the intended beneficiaries of the Wil-
liams Act,'" such options cannot be deemed violative of section
14(e). Ignoring the clear Supreme Court mandate, the Mobil court,
utilizing the antimanipulation language of section 14(e), has at-
tempted to substantially enlarge the section by including anticompe-
titive activities. Regardless of the desirable policy implications of
such a reading, the legislative history discloses no such intent to in-
clude anticompetitive practices within the purview of the section. In
fact, the legislative history implies just the opposite. 157
Icahn appears to directly contradict Mobil on its face by giving
cursory treatment to the Mobil analysis before concluding that the
155. Such a placement of stock into friendly hands has tacitly been viewed as not falling
within the gambit of the term "manipulation." See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S.
1 (1977).
156. Id. at 28.
157. "[Tlhe bidder and defending management ... do not need any additional protec-
tion . . . [tihey have the resources and the arsenal of moves and countermoves which can
adequately protect their interests." 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 57. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 29.
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Williams Act was not intended to encroach upon management's pre-
rogative to oppose a tender offer not in the shareholders' best inter-
ests. In essence, Icahn's treatment of lock-ups as issues of state fidu-
ciary law is consistent with prior Supreme Court analysis and
refutes the Mobil court's interpretation of lock-ups as violations of
federal securities law. However, the fact that the Icahn court had to
rely on the clarification agreement implies that the court had some
difficulty in distinguishing Mobil.
In sum, the cases subsequent to Mobil imply that lock-ups
should no longer be characterized as options, but rather should be
contracts or stock purchase agreements containing limited escape
provisions for the white knights.1" Therefore, except in situations or
factual patterns very similar to Mobil, the continued vitality of Mobil
remains in doubt.' 69
IV. PROPOSAL
In light of Santa Fe's mandate proscribing the use of federal
securities law to create a federal fiduciary duty, the use of lock-up
devices by a target to thwart unsolicited takeover attempts should be
attacked under state corporation law. It is clear from both the legis-
lative history and judicial interpretation that the Williams Act, as it
currently stands, is neither designed nor intended to prohibit the use
of lock-ups. Unfortunately, current state corporation law provides
inadequate protection for target shareholders who are the victims of
defensive tactics designed to entrench management's position of con-
trol. The requirement that shareholders must show gross manage-
ment overreaching or fraud before the burden will shift to the defen-
dant directors has resulted in a business judgment rule that is really
no rule. The vast majority of the courts have even rejected the con-
cept that the directors' conflict of interest is sufficient to shift the
burden of proof
To remedy this situation and provide protection for the forgot-
ten shareholder, the federal securities law should be amended to in-
clude a federal fiduciary standard. The Supreme Court in Santa Fe
suggested the need for such a federal standard but concluded that the
laws, as enacted, did not provide for one.160 The differing degrees of
state judicial scrutiny of fiduciary responsibility illustrate the need
158. See generally Masters, Lock-up Devices Can Pass Muster, Legal Times Wash.,
April 5, 1982, at 1, ool.2.
159. Id. at 10, col. 2.
160. 430 U.S. at 479-80.
[Vol. 24
WILLIAMS ACT
for some national uniformity. This inconsistency is highlighted by
the fact that corporations of national, prominanence, incorporated in
one state, have the ability to affect the lives and fortunes of individ-
ual investors across the nation through interstate trading of the cor-
poration's shares.
In the past, when there has been a perceived problem of na-
tional scope, Congress has not hesitated to enact appropriate legisla-
tion. The 1934 Act and Williams Act were both congressional re-
sponses to national problems perceived by lawmakers. The area of
fiduciary regulation is clearly of equal scope.
National corporations have traditionally been owned by a geo-
graphically diverse group of shareholders representing all fifty states.
To relegate these shareholders' grievances for directoral breach of
fiduciary duty solely to a determination under the law of the state of
residence of a given shareholder would result in similarly situated
shareholders receiving unequal treatment. That is, the determination
of whether or not one shareholder would have a cause of action
would be based upon the mere fortuity of the shareholder's state of
residence. Large multistate corporations are affected with a rational
interest that makes this type of disparate treatment between share-
holders intolerable. It is this kind of inequity that the 1934 Act was
intended to regulate, namely, actions by fiduciaries in one state ad-
versely affecting the interests of shareholders in other states. The un-
derlying rationale of the 1934 Act has been that corporations affect-
ing a national interest, that is, corporations whose securities are
traded on national exchanges or through other channels of interstate
commerce, require national regulation to protect shareholders in all
fifty states.
Of course, federalism concerns dictate that any federal fiduciary
legislation be carefully drafted to minimize any undue interference
with state corporation law. As previously noted by the Court in
Santa Fe, corporations are creatures of state law, and investors com-
mit their funds to an undertaking with the assumption that state law
will control unless there is some express and important reason for
enacting and applying federal law. Thus, in order to address existing
inequities, legislation should be limited to national types of
corporations.
The disparate state judicial review of fiduciary actions in con-
nection with tender offers, combined with the prior congressional
history of regulating to protect shareholders, indicates that the time
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has come to recognize a national fiduciary standard"1 as suggested
by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe. Further, Congress is the only
governmental body with the time and authority to carefully draft this
much needed legislation.
Congressional hearings disclose a clear intent that the "manipu-
lation" term remain flexible, consistent with its interpretation in
Santa Fe. But, this flexibility must be read in light of the purpose of
the Williams Act to prevent the artificial distortion of the market
price of shares to a level unrelated to the natural supply and de-
mand. From this it becomes obvious that the congressional intent as
interpreted by Santa Fe was that the term manipulation must be
flexibly interpreted to cover "the full range of ingenious devices that
might be used to manipulate securities prices.'' 62
Considering this congressional mandate, the S.E.C. would be
acting beyond its scope should it enact regulations to generate a fed-
eral fiduciary standard. The role of the S.E.C. is to promulgate reg-
ulations necessary to implement the congressional intent, but not to
go beyond that role into the realm of independent legislation. The
S.E.C. is limited to merely suggesting the existence of problems, and
proposing possible solutions to Congress. Congress is the only entity
that can independently enact curative legislation. Hence, the rule-
making authority given to the Commission in 1970 would be inade-
quate in generating any regulatory federal fiduciary standard.
Judicial expansion of secton 10(b) and section 14(e) to create a
quasi-federal fiduciary duty is undesirable for two reasons. First,
such an expansion would be a judicial encroachment on congres-
sional authority and expertise. The area of securities regulation is a
complicated one, wherein inordinate amounts of time and painstak-
ing attention to detail are given by Congress. The congressional
hearings on the Williams Act generated nearly 600 pages of testi-
mony, illustrating the interest and expertise required in this area of
legislation. This leads to the second reason enumerated in Santa Fe,
namely, that the current legislation does not provide for such a na-
tional fuduciary duty and until such a duty is created by Congress,
no distortion of the federal securities law should be made to create
one. Thus, the Supreme Court was careful to defer to congressional
161. To avoid any undue encroachment into areas traditionally left to state regulation,
this federal fiduciary legislation should be limited to corporations required to be registered
pursuant to § 12 of the 1934 Act. Thus, intrastate or small family corporations would remain
unaffected. This federal status is already required by § 10 of the 1934 Act, as well as many of
the subsections in § 14 of the 1934 Act.
162. 430 U.S. at 477-78 (emphasis added).
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judgment in an area wrought with emotional public policy
arguments.
As such, the only viable method for creating national unity of
treatment in an area currently receiving disparate treatment by the
different states would be the creation of a federal fiduciary duty for
national corporations.
Given such direction by Congress, the S.E.C. could promulgate
appropreate rules so as to carefully delineate the breadth of the fed-
eral duty. Until some or all of these reforms are implemented, use of
the antimanipulation language of section 14(e) to prohibit lock-up
arrangements would be an unwarranted and unjustifiable expansion
beyond the section's intended scope.
V. CONCLUSION
The state corporation law, as manifested in the business judg-
ment rule, has largely been unsuccessful in preventing the injustices
arising from managerial defensive responses to hostile tender offers.
To date, the judiciary has not widely recognized the inherent conflict
of interest that arises when target managements defend against hos-
tile offers under the color of protecting shareholders. As was shown,
such actions are often motivated by the directors' desire to maintain
their positions of status and influence. In situations involving lock-
ups, the courts have continued to defer to management's business
judgment.
Similarly, the federal securities laws were not intended, nor
designed, to prohibit lock-ups that do not significantly influence the
market price for shares. Rather, the courts have essentially viewed
lock-ups as constituting a breach of fiduciary duty. Since the current
federal securities law was not designed to prevent director abuses,
and the state law has largely refused to act unless there is a showing
of fraud or gross overreaching, the dilemma of the defenseless share-
holder can only be remedied by enacting a federal fiduciary stan-
dard. Such a standard would bring uniformity to the treatment of
shareholders whose fiduciaries have violated their trust to act in the
shareholders' best interest.
William T. Lewis
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